For four alternatives and an even number of individuals, we prove a conjecture in a companion paper: It is impossible for a social choice rule to satisfy all of (1) Pareto, (2) anonymity, (3) full domain, and (4) independence of some alternative, a relaxation of Arrow's IIA.
1 We would like to thank two referees who found a significant error in an earlier version.
Introduction.
A social welfare function f defined for the set X of alternatives satisfies Independence of Some Alternative (ISA) if for every distinct pair {x, y} of alternatives there is some z  X such that f(p)|{x,y} = f(q)|{x,y} if the profiles p and q agree on X\{z}. (When X = {x, y, z} ISA is equivalent to IIA.) This paper proves, when X has exactly four alternatives, a conjecture from Campbell and Kelly (2005) where definitions and notation are provided.
CONJECTURE:
For any X, there does not exist a rule satisfying all of: Independence of Some Alternative, Pareto, full domain, transitivity, and anonymity.
The relevance map  for social welfare function f identifies the smallest subset ({x,y}) of X such that f(p)|{x,y} = f(q)|{x,y} whenever p and q agree on ({x,y}). Campbell and Kelly (2000) show that if X is finite there will be a smallest such set. Then Campbell and Kelly (2005) proved the above conjecture for the case of relevance maps that satisfy exclusion: A triple {x,y,z} satisfies exclusion if x  (y,z), y  (x,z), and z  (x,y) and relevance map  satisfies exclusion if there is at least one triple satisfying exclusion. If x  ({y,z}), y  ({x,z}), and z  ({x,y}) then we can restrict attention to the profiles for which the top three alternatives in each individual ordering are x, y, and z, with the remaining alternatives in fixed positions relative to each other and to x, y, and z. Then over this sub-family of profiles, IIA is satisfied as we move x, y, and z around, and that leads to dictatorship of the restriction of f to the subfamily if f satisfies Pareto. This implies that f violates anonymity.
But there are relevance maps that fail exclusion but still satisfy ISA. Here we prove the more general result for the case with an even number of individuals and four alternatives: X = {w,x,y,z}. In the first three sections, we treat the case of just two individuals. This is generalized in Section 4.
We start by determining the relevance maps we need to consider. For a rule f that satisfies ISA, Pareto, and full domain, Campbell and Kelly (2005) have shown that if the relevance map for f is simple, i.e., if {x,y}  (u,v) implies (x,y)  (u,v), then it satisfies exclusion. So all relevance maps that violate exclusion may be found among those that fail simplicity. Without loss of generality, we may consider as a generic case of simplicity violation with ISA holding:
({y,z}) = {y,z,w}
To exploit this, we draw on a result from Campbell and Kelly (2000) :
Map Theorem. For any transitive-valued Paretian social welfare function f on a full domain, where x, y, and w are any three distinct alternatives in X, it cannot be the case that both  (x,y) = {x,y} and  (y,w) = {y,w}  B where
Returning to the relevance map satisfying (), if ({y,w}) = {y,w}, that, together with ({x,y}) = {x,y,z}, would violate the map theorem, so ({y,w}) = {y,w,x} or ({y,w}) = {y,w,z}. Similarly, ({x,z}) = {x,z} plus ({y,z})
= {y,z,w} violate the map theorem so ({x,z}) = {x,z,y} or ({x,z}) = {x,z,w}. ({x,w}) = {x,w} plus ({x,y}) = {x,y,z} also violate the map theorem, so ({x,w}) = {x,w,y} or ({x,w}) = {x,w,z}. ({z,w}) = {z,w} is consistent with both ({x,y}) = {x,y,z} and ({y,z}) = {y,z,w}, but would be inconsistent with ({y,w}) = {y,w,x} or ({x,w}) = {x,w,y} or ({x,z}) = {x,z,y}. So the possible cases are either: This leaves maps 6 and 8. Neither can be derived from map 1 by permuting letters. To see this, note that for the eight cases above, all four letters occur as c in a map image ({a,b}) = {a,b,c} but in maps 6 and 8, only three letters occur this way. However, map 8 can be obtained from map 6 by the permutation (x,y,z,w). Therefore there are only two significantly different cases, #1 and #6. Neither admits a transitive-valued social welfare function on a full domain satisfying ISA, Pareto, and anonymity. We take the two maps up in turn.
Relevance Map #1
We are treating the relevance map: Since ({xy}) = {x,y,z} and not {x,y}, there must be a pair of profiles that agree on {x,y} but yield different social rankings on x,y (because they don't agree on all of {x,y,z}). By Pareto, these must be profiles on which the two individuals disagree on x and y. There are nine kinds of profiles that must be considered, each described by a subprofile: So for at least one of these subprofiles, x  y must hold in the social ranking. Our first step is to show that we need only consider the sixth profile on the list.
Proposition 1:
If f is a rule satisfying all of ISA, full domain, transitivity, and anonymity, then for each subprofile u i in the table, if x  y at u i , then we also have x  y at u 6 .
Proof: The steps in this proof are much like the steps in the contagion part of the standard proof of Arrow's theorem. However, because the relevance map here is more complicated than that for a rule satisfying IIA, there are many more steps. We treat u 1 explicitly.
The nine sub-profiles are identical when restricted to {x, y}. So for any u i we merely insert w just below y to get y ( w 2 In tables like this, the first cell contains a profile being analyzed. The second and third cells are partial descriptions of the value at the profile for any rule satisfying all of: ISA, Pareto, full domain, transitivity, and anonymity. [Note: "by P" means by the Pareto condition.] The fourth cell is a transitivity consequence of the entries in cells two and three. The last cell is an implication derived from the relevance map, the profile in the first cell and the consequence in the fourth cell.
8 and thus the conclusion of (2) by transitivity. The remaining steps apply without modification, resulting in x ( y at u 6 .
Assume x  y in the social ranking at u 1 :
(1) zz xy ) x  y. yx and then establish a sequence of deductions 2 : It now suffices to prove that, for the sixth subprofile in the table there is no rule satisfying Pareto, full domain, transitivity, and anonymity for which the relevance map  is that of case #1 and where x  y at subprofile u 6 . During that proof we will need to know that a similar claim is true for having x  y at subprofile u 1 , so we begin there. This derivation of (6) from (5) uses anonymity; we indicate this by the asterisk in (5*).
Henceforth, we will use asterisks to indicate applications of anonymity. Our second goal will be to prove two more results: yx wz
although again we will use later some of the steps in the sequence to these results. In the first path we assume x ( z and in the second we assume z  x. At the end of each path we will find a contradiction. (21) z ( w by (P)
The contradiction we seek will be between this conclusion of (22) and the result of a second sequence we now start: (20) z ( x by (25) w ( x wy xx ) w ( x yw (26) and anonymity contradict (22); we were led to this by assuming (15) which must then be false, so (14) is true. We now return to our main line of derivations. The last contradiction we seek will be between this conclusion of (29) and the result of a short final sequence: (29); we were led to this by assuming there exists a rule satisfying (1), so no such rule exists. *
Pareto implies x ( y whenever both individuals prefer x to y. If the social welfare function f yields y ( x at every other profile then ({x,y}) = {x, y}. But we know that ({x,y}) = {x, y, z} and thus x  y must hold at some profile at which one person prefers y to x. We have just shown that this is impossible if  is relevance map #1 and the associated social welfare function is transitive-valued and satisfies Pareto and anonymity on a full domain. We conclude by showing that this is also true in the case of relevance map #6.
Relevance Map #6
As we noted above, relevance map #6 S (S) Again, for at least one of these subprofiles, we may assume x  y and our first step is to show that we need only consider the sixth profile on the list.
Proposition 4:
For each subprofile u i in the table, if x  y in the social ranking at u i , then we also have x  y in the social ranking at u 6 .
Proof: This time start with the subprofile u 2 and assume x  y in the social ranking there:
(1) zy xz ) x  y. We are going to assume such a rule does exist and derive an inconsistency. We start of course from (18) contradicts (17) we must drop the assumption that there exists a rule satisfying (1); no such rule exists.
*

Larger numbers
It remains to show how far our analysis can be generalized to larger numbers of individuals and alternatives. It is straightforward to see that a proof for n = 2 implies a corresponding theorem for any even number of individuals. Suppose n = 2r and that there exists a rule F for n satisfying all of: ISA, Pareto, full domain, transitivity, and anonymity. Then for just two individuals, define a rule f that at profile u yields F(u, u, ..., u) at r copies of u. Rule f will inherit ISA, Pareto, full domain, transitivity, and anonymity from F. Since we have shown no such rule f exists, there must not be any for n = 2r.
